According to a 1993 National Research Council publication, "Democratization in the Middle East: Trends and Prospects": "liberal democracy has been the exception rather than the rule in the contemporary Middle East. . .Often dominated by a strong-man, authoritarian Arab regimes have opposed the introduction of fundamental democratic practices, such as regularly held free elections with multiple political parties, accountability of the rulers to the ruled, freedom of speech and association, and respect for individual human rights." Although this quotation focuses on Arab regimes, one may draw the same conclusion about non-Arab regimes in the Middle East. The exceptions are Jews in Israel and Turks in Turkey.

Iraqi Kurds, who have raised the slogan of democracy for almost half a century, had a chance to practice it for the first time on May 19, 1992, when the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the largest political parties in Kurdistan-Iraq, agreed to hold an election in the area under their control to fill an "administration vacuum" resulting from the withdrawal of the Iraqi officials in October 1991. The KDP and PUK gained the largest number -- and almost an equal number -- of votes. Since then, they have issued laws and decisions, administered affairs, and collected taxes within the regional parliament and government.

Two years after the election, one may review the process of democracy in Kurdistan since in many views the Kurdish experiment may serve as a model for the entire state of Iraq.

In addition to appointing two cabinets, the Kurdish Parliament issued dozens of laws and decisions. These decisions and laws mainly canceled and/or replaced Iraqi laws governing the region before the election. There were also new laws, such as the law to "Protect Foreigners in Kurdistan," the "Publications Law," the "Decision of Federation of Kurdistan," and the "Parties Law." Despite shortcomings in the process and/or the contents of the issued laws, these laws were issued in a spirit of freedom toward implementing democracy in the region. Thus, small-scale fighting and assassinations of a few political figures have not unduly distressed observers since such occurrences are "normal" under the unusual regional circumstances. The area witnessed stability from October 1991 to October 1993.

From the democracy's inception, however, the concept of sharing power between the KDP and PUK carried potential risks because both groups have competed against each other in representing and leading the Kurds since the 1960's. On several occasions, these competitions have turned into large-scale fighting. While both parties have co-operated on political issues since forming the Kurdistan Front in 1988, the transition from the "disagreement phase" to the "cooperation phase" does not occur quickly in a tribal society. Good examples are the political chaos in Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Somalia. Thus, in implementing democracy in Kurdistan, several problems have resulted. If these problems are not resolved quickly, the Iraqi Kurds may lose both their freedom and their current political status.

The first problem emerges from the concept of power-sharing in the government. Power- sharing between the two parties is based on a 50-50 rule. Each party has 50 seats in the parliament and half of the government's ministers. When a party appoints someone to a position, his or her deputy will be appointed by the second party. Thus, if the president of the Parliament (Prime Minister) is from the KDP, then his deputy is from the PUK, and vice versa. The same rule applies in appointing provincial governors, and heads of police and security forces. While it may be natural for party members to fill high positions, both parties adhere to the same policies to fill all positions. As one result, many individuals, including intellectuals, have felt compelled to join one of the parties in order to be considered for employment (as noted by poet Hassieb Karadaghi in a December 10, 1993, interview appearing in Asbarq al-Awsat). This tradition was very common in Kurdistan when Baghdad ruled the area. Then, the regime forced the Kurds, as well as others, to join the Ba'ath Party to get governmental privileges.

A second problem was raised by the newly granted right of freedom of expression. The Publications Law guarantees that every political party and organization could own television and radio stations, and could publish newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals. Thus, five TV stations, seven radio stations, two daily (Kurdish) and 13 weekly (Kurdish and Arabic) newspapers, in addition to several monthly and quarterly journals, exist in Kurdistan. However, in the absence of a national broadcast and publication, television stations and newspapers became the propaganda tools for their owners, which caused divisions among the people.

The third and most dangerous problem was raised by an attempt to unify the Peshmerga into a "Kurdish Army". This action was initiated to reduce the number of militiamen, to increase their efficiency, and to prepare them for a new task. However, the law was designed to give the two parties the largest percentage of men and arms. Predictably, the other parties viewed this law as a threat to their power and resisted it. In addition, one problem caused by this move was that the loyalty of the Peshmerga remained with their parties or with a third party, the militiamen acted according to party orders. For example, the minister of the Peshmerga (PUK) refused to obey Mr. Massoud Barzani's (the co-supreme leader of Kurdistan) order to stop a fight between the PUK and the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMK) that occurred last December. More recently, the May clashes between the PUK and the KDP ended the reality of a united Kurdish army on the ground. One may conclude that the political experience in Kurdistan has not developed, as was expected, despite the good will of Kurdish leaders. In my opinion, the Kurdish experiment lacks three major factors: national theme and goal, economic and educational bases, and stability.

The Kurdish Parliament adopted the model of "Federation" for Kurdistan. In addition to the term's ambiguity, no major political entity in the Middle East (except the Iraqi National Congress) recognized the Kurdish decision. The term's precise meaning will be determined after negotiations with the Baghdad regime takes place. On the other hand, the Kurdish Parliament issues laws and the Kurdish Government operates as if an independent state. The uncertain political future prevents the development of a national theme or goal. Therefore, a free press and power-sharing could perhaps increase the divisions among the Kurds rather than uniting them.

The Kurds lack access to adequate economic and educational bases which are necessary for the development of a democracy. The region is suffering from two economic embargoes; externally by the United Nations' sanction against Iraq, and internally by the Iraqi regime since October 1991. Thus, the region lacks basic needs such as electricity, food, and medicine. It suffers from high inflation and high unemployment. On the educational front, the Kurdish Administration opened universities in Dohuk and Suleymania, in addition to the university in Arbil. All the universities and hundreds of schools lack books and teachers. For its part, the government lacks the experience and resources to solve these problems.

Kurdistan-Iraq's orders are tenuous on all sides. Iran, Turkey, and Iraq threaten the area directly through their military forces and, indirectly through agents inside Kurdistan. Bombing villages and assassinating political activities are not unusual occurrences. With its limited capacity, the government could only attempt to try to restore internal security. However, recent fighting between various parties has made security precarious.

Despite numerous challenges, the Kurdish experiment in democracy has, up to now, successfully met them, both internally and externally, and has provided much-needed stability to the region. Kurdish leaders -- from the KDP, IMK, and PUK -- continue to announce that democracy will prevail in Kurdistan. Increasing the unity of people, learning from past mistakes, working harder to develop the path to democracy, and sharing power and responsibility -- all are necessary steps to be taken by the Kurds as they strive to preserve their present strength and improve their political status. The lesson of the Kurdish experiment, one may conclude, is that an election in and of itself cannot solve a nation's problems. Rather, an election creates a framework for decision-making.

NOTE: This article was written prior to the recent clashes between the PUK and KDP

	First Cabinet July 1, 1992	Second Cabinet April 25, 1993
Prime Minister	M. Foud Massum+	Kosret Abdullah Rassul Ali+
V. Prime Minister	Rosh Nuri Shawhess++	Same
Interior	Rosh Nuri Shawhess++	Younis M. Salim Rosbayania ++
Peshmerga	Kamal Mufti+	Jabar Farman+
Transportation & Communication	Idrees Hadi Salih++	Same
Education	Nasih Gafure Ramadan++	Same
Human Services	M. Tawfig Rahim+	Same
Economy & Finance	Salahaddin M. Hassan Hafeed+	Darow Nuri+
Culture	Sherkow Bikas+	Same
Energy & Industry	M. Amin Mawlood Amin++	Same
Agriculture	Kadir Aziz Hamed Amin+	Sa'adi Ahman Pira+
Tourism	Kafiya Sulayman Abduallah+	Same
Health & Social Affairs	Kamal Shakir Mohammed *	Same
Construction	Ma'amon Nur M. Briefkani ++	Same
Awqaf & Islamic Affairs	Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmen++	Same
Justice	---	Kadir Aziz M. Jabari+
Housing & Labor	Younadim Yousuf Kana**	Same