Since his Sept. 12 speech at the United Nations, President Bush has scored two victories: Saddam Hussein has accepted unconditional return of international weapons inspectors, and the U.S. Congress is supporting Bush's case to take military action against Iraq.

However, Bush's call on Iraq to change its regime will remain unpopular, unless the people of Iraq demand and work toward that change.

Bush's call to overthrow Hussein is not new. The first President Bush, too, encouraged the Iraqis to topple Hussein in 1991; Bill Clinton adopted a ``containment'' policy in 1993, supported covert actions against Hussein in 1995-96 and passed the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. But no plan was adopted to strengthen the Iraqi people at the grass-roots level.

More than 26 million Iraqis - in silence and in pain - heard the latest call for war. Their main concern is how their country and lives will change after Hussein.

Iraq comprises three major ethnic and sectarian groups: Sunni Arabs, Shi'te Arabs and Kurds. Despite their anti-Hussein policies, their support of the United States depends on whether each group's political and economic interests can be met.

* Sunni Arabs, represented by military officers and influential tribal leaders as well as senior members of the ruling party (Bath Party), fear that a war on Iraq will result in security chaos. Some Shi'te Arabs could use the power vacuum and launch a revenge campaign against them. Therefore, the Sunnis want to lead a coup to replace Hussein but also keep the existing political system. This group includes the Iraqi National Accord, Iraqi National Coalition and Free Officers Movement.

* Shi'te Arabs, represented by several religious figures and political parties, fear that they will be marginalized from any significant political role in the future system because of their close link to Iran and the resistance of the Sunni Arabs and other Arab states. The Shi'te Arabs compose more than 55 percent of the population, thus they would favor a democratic system that would give them the power. At present, they oppose the war. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution, based in Iran, is representative of this group.

* Kurds are the most organized group and have a military force of more than 70,000 men. They have been on good terms with U.S. administrations since 1991. One of the U.S. plans may depend on using bases in Kurdistan and its military support to end Hussein's forces. Nevertheless, the Kurdish leaders reject the war because they fear that a new regime in Baghdad would end Kurdish self-rule, which was established in 1991. They also fear losing the 13 percent of oil revenue (based on the 1995 United Nations Security Council Resolution 986) that they currently receive.

For Iraqis to support overthrowing their ruler, they must be able to envision something better in their future.

This could be accomplished if the Bush administration were to adopt a "Pro-Iraq/Anti-Hussein" policy, that is, a policy that supports democracy for Iraq rather than ambitious power-seekers. It does not mean that the United States can (or should) solve century-old problems; it means that it can plant the seed of democracy.

If the U.S. government is serious about overthrowing Hussein, it should start by forming a well-represented council in exile. No one should fear having a Shi'te-dominating council, but there should be reassurances that no group will be given absolute power and that Kurdistan will be granted federation status. These actions would gain Iraqi political support.

The council would move into Kurdistan, with international protection, and challenge Hussein to establish free and fair elections. If he were to accept, the United States could guarantee the fairness of the elections. If he were to refuse, the council could initiate an alternative.

If the Iraqi people are convinced that the United States and the international community are genuinely concerned about Iraq's affairs, and that a new political system may benefit them, they will support an overthrow of Hussein's regime.

On the other hand, if they perceive that the United States simply wants to replace Hussein with a friendly regime to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, then the Iraqi people will continue to remain silent.

Salah Aziz is Executive Director of the American Society for Kurds.

The Miami Herald: Special to the Herald, October 4, 2002