For nine years unnoticed by many Americans, Turkish soldiers and Kurdish separatist have waged a guerilla war. Thousands died. On June 24, Kurdish fighters struck at Turkish interest all over Europe. When will there be peace.

On June 24, Kurdish protesters attacked Turkish consulates, banks and travel offices in more than 26 locations across Europe. One protester was killed, several were wounded, and approximately 200 people were arrested. The Turkish authorities laid blame for the attacks on the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) . The June 24 attacks reflected a long history of tensions between Turks and Kurds.

The tension began in the beginning of the 19th century, when the Ottomans adopted a new policy of increased centralization and restrictions on Kurdish provinces that had enjoyed self-rule. The new policy brought forth a vigorous resistance from the Kurds, including armed uprising (all unsuccessful) in 1928, 1934, and 1880.

In 1920, the Treaty of Sevres called for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan. In the midst of a war to restore Turkish hegemony in territories occupied by Greece and France during the First World War, Kemal Ataturk (the founder of the Turkish Republic) asked for Kurdish support in exchange for a promise that "Turks and Kurds would live as brothers and equals."

Following Turkey's success against the Greeks and French, the Allied nations established relations with the new Republic of Turkey. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne replaced the Turkish state. Kurdish autonomy was thus effectively denied.

Left without a state,

SALAH AZIZ is director of the Badlisy Center for Kurdish Studies and a physics professor at Florida A & M University.

the Kurds faced a new challenge: The government passed legislation "canceling" the existence of the Kurdish nation. Once again, the Kurds resorted to armed resistance. rebellions in 1925, 1930, and 1938 were unsuccessful. Kurdish casualties were reported in the thousands; thousands of Kurdish villages were either destroyed or evacuated.

From the early 1920's until 1990, successive Turkish administrations banned the very word "Kurd from public discourse. Consistent with this were bans on the Kurdish language, music, clothes, and of course, political organizations and publications focusing on Kurdish issues.

Areas traditionally associated with the Kurdish population were "left behind" in the national development; it was only after 1950 that modern schools, roads, and hospitals began to appear in Kurdish areas.

In late 1960's, new Kurdish cultural and political parties began to appear. Most were Marxist- Leninist. They were influenced by the ideological drift of other "liberation" movements, in particular the Turkish socialist parties, which were supportive of Kurdish rights.

The PKK formed in 1979 under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, a former student of political science at Ankara University. The PKK adopted Kurdish independence as its political goal, and advocated guerilla warfare as the means to attain this end. In 1984, the organization began a military campaign that continues to the present -- witness June 24. As a result, approximately 6,000 people have been killed.

Most immediately, on May 24, the cease-fire proclaimed by the PKK ended. Since then, 1,300 people have been killed, the Turkish authorities have extended the "state of emergency" in 10 provinces, and Tansu Ciller, the new prime minister, has announced plans to give priority to military means in Turkey's attempts to discipline the PKK.

Although the PKK is not the only Kurdish political party in Kurdistan-Turkey, its military action made the Kurdish issue a top priority for the Turkish government. Thus, in April 1990, former President Turgat Ozal announced that his government would seek a political solution to its conflict.

Most of Turkey's political parties at least admit the reality of a Kurdish community, and many have proposed political solutions to the "Kurdish problem", the Turkish military still believes it can solve the problem with force.

This fact threatens to overwhelm interest in a political settlement. Murat Yetkin, a Turkish journalist, reminds us that "there has not been a single example (since the 1920s) of a (Turkish) government taking a decision counter to the ad vice of the military."

In the context of the struggle between those advocating a political settlement to the Kurdish issue, and those favoring a military approach, the Turkish government was unable to respond positively to the PKK's unilateral cease-fire declared on March 20, 1993.

Advocates of a political settlement should not give up hope, however. Despite the difficulties on both sides, there are positive developments, and these should be encouraged by Turkish and Kurdish leaders.

From the Kurdish point of view, the positive developments encouraged by President Ozal remain in place: the veto on the term "Kurd" has been removed; 20 members of the Parliament defend Kurdish rights; books, magazines, radio and television broadcasts address the Kurdish issue with regularity. Clearly there is momentum which any Kurdish group must consider as positive.

From a Turkish perspective, there are important reasons to continue the policies of President Ozal, and even to further them. Turkey has ambitions to become a regional superpower, with influence from Central Asia to the Balkans. It also wishes to be the foremost example of modernization and democracy in the Islamic world. Its location, large population and history of holding power make these ambitions logical for Turkey. But a weak economy, political instability, and persistent violations of human rights -- all factors in Turkey's historic dealing with the Kurds -- present obstacles to the fulfillment of Turkey's legitimate ambitions.

To fulfill its longstanding ambitions, Turkey needs stability and democracy. Ankara could go a long way toward the fulfillment of its goals by granting human, cultural, and political rights to the Kurds. Investors do not risk their money in an unstable region. Mobil Oil Turk, third largest producer in Turkey, canceled its operations following PKK attack in September 1992. To restore stability, the Turkish government spent hundreds of millions of dollars monthly to control the Kurdish areas.

What will it take for Turkey to solve its "Kurdish problem?" From the Kurdish point of view, the provision of freedom to educate children in the Kurdish language and to establish Kurdish political parties are the two most immediate requirements for a settlement. Such provisions already have the support of the European community, and are crucial to Turkey's own identity as a democratic nation.

Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK advocates an understanding of Kurdish self-determination that accords with the approach endorsed by the international community in the case of Kurds living in Kurdistan-Iraq. Given this, it is difficult to see why there could not be an arrangement that honors both Kurdish desires for self-determination and Turkish interests in preserving national strength.

Leadership in this regard should come from the Turkish authorities in Ankara, who might find it in their interest to develop proposals around notions of self-governance for the Kurds.

In any case, have we not learned from the example of the now defunct Soviet Union that might without right cannot long serve as the source of stability in a modern state?

Note: The author wishes to thank Professor John Kelsay from Florida State University for his input.

Tallahassee Democrat, Sunday, October 3, 1993